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THE BORELL-EHRHARD GAME
RAMON VAN HANDEL
Abstract. A precise description of the convexity of Gaussian measures is
provided by sharp Brunn-Minkowski type inequalities due to Ehrhard and
Borell. We show that these are manifestations of a game-theoretic mechanism:
a minimax variational principle for Brownian motion. As an application, we
obtain a Gaussian improvement of Barthe’s reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality.
1. Introduction
The convexity properties of probability measures play an important role in vari-
ous areas of probability theory, analysis, and geometry. They arise in a fundmental
manner, for example, in the study of concentration phenomena [28, 2] and in func-
tional analysis and convex geometry [12, 1]. Among the most delicate results in this
area are the remarkable convexity properties of Gaussian measures [14, 31, 27, 8, 10].
The aim of this paper is to shed some new light on the latter topic.
Let γn be the standard Gaussian measure on R
n. The simplest expression of the
convexity of Gaussian measures is given by the log-concavity property:
λ log(γn(A)) + (1− λ) log(γn(B)) ≤ log(γn(λA + (1− λ)B))
for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and Borel sets A,B ⊆ Rn, where A+ B := {x+ y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B}
denotes Minkowski addition. This inequality is easily deduced from the classical
Brunn-Minkowski inequality, which is the analogous statement for Lebesgue mea-
sure. However, while the importance of log-concavity can hardly be overstated, we
expect in the case of Gaussian measures that convexity should appear in a much
stronger form than can be explained by log-concavity alone. For example, the
classical isoperimetric inequality for Euclidean volume is an easy and fundamen-
tal consequence of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality [21], but log-concavity fails to
explain the analogous isoperimetric property of Gaussian measures [27].
A precise description of the convexity of Gaussian measures was developed in a
remarkable paper by Ehrhard [14], who introduced the following sharp analogue of
the Brunn-Minkowski inequality for Gaussian measures:
λΦ−1(γn(A)) + (1− λ)Φ−1(γn(B)) ≤ Φ−1(γn(λA + (1− λ)B)),
where Φ(x) := γ1((−∞, x]). This inequality becomes equality when A,B are paral-
lel halfspaces, and is a strict improvement over log-concavity as the function logΦ
is concave. It has numerous interesting and important implications, including the
isoperimetric property of Gaussian measures that arises as a special case [27, 31].
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Given the fundamental nature of Ehrhard’s inequality, it is natural to seek other
Gaussian analogues of the rich family of results that appear in the classical Brunn-
Minkowski theory (cf. [21, 4] and the references therein). Progress in this direction
has remained relatively limited, however. Unlike the classical Brunn-Minkowski
inequality, which is well understood from many different perspectives, only two ap-
proaches to Ehrhard’s inequality are known. Ehrhard’s original proof [14], using
a Gaussian analogue of Steiner symmetrization, is limited to the case where the
sets A,B are convex; it was later extended by Lata la [26] to eliminate the con-
vexity assumption on one of the two sets. The long-standing problem of proving
Ehrhard’s inequality for arbitrary Borel sets was finally settled by Borell [8], who
also introduced a number of significant generalizations of this inequality [9, 10].
Borell’s elegant approach, using a nonlinear heat equation and the parabolic max-
imum principle, relies on some delicate cancellations (as will be explained below),
complicating efforts to identify how it can be applied in other settings. A more
abstract variant of Borell’s approach is given in [5, 24], but the mechanism that
makes this approach work remains somewhat mysterious. Let us note, in addition,
that unlike many other geometric inequalities (including the Gaussian isoperimetric
inequality) that extend to more general settings, Ehrhard’s inequality appears to
be uniquely Gaussian; see [25, §4.3] for some discussion on this point.
The aim of this paper is to develop a new interpretation of Ehrhard’s inequality:
we will show that both Ehrhard’s inequality and its generalizations due to Borell
arise as manifestations of a stochastic game that appears to lie at the heart of these
phenomena. This unexpected game-theoretic mechanism provides new insight into
the success of earlier proofs, and allows us to identify new convexity results for
Gaussian measures. In particular, we will develop a Gaussian improvement of
Barthe’s reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality, addressing a question posed in [5].
1.1. Borell’s stochastic method. To motivate the ideas that will be introduced
in the sequel, let us begin by recalling a powerful approach, also due to Borell [7],
for proving log-concavity of Gaussian measures.
In order to show that γn (or any other measure) is log-concave, it is natural
to seek a representation formula for log(γn(A)) from which the concavity property
becomes evident. A fundamental representation of this type, the Gibbs variational
principle, dates back to the earliest work on statistical mechanics [22]:
log
(∫
ef dγn
)
= sup
µ
{∫
f dµ−H(µ||γn)
}
,
where H(µ||γn) denotes relative entropy and the supremum is taken over all prob-
ability measures µ. The log-concavity property could be read off directly from this
formulation using displacement convexity of relative entropy as developed in the
theory of optimal transportation [35]. However, in the case of Gaussian measures,
a simpler approach becomes available by identifying γn with the distribution of
the value of a Brownian motion {Wt} at time one. The advantage gained by this
approach is that absolutely continuous changes of measure of Brownian motion ad-
mit an explicit characterization by Girsanov’s theorem [32], which gives rise to the
following reformulation of the Gibbs variational principle for Gaussian measures:
log
(∫
ef dγn
)
= sup
α
E
[
f
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
‖αt‖2 dt
]
,
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where the supremum is taken over all progressively measurable processes α. This
formula was originally obtained using PDE methods by Fleming [18]; the connection
with the Gibbs variational principle was developed by Boue´ and Dupuis [11].
It was observed by Borell in [7] that log-concavity of the Gaussian measure is
an almost immediate consequence of this identity. Let us illustrate this idea in its
functional (Pre´kopa-Leindler) form. Let f, g, h be functions such that
λ log(f(x)) + (1 − λ) log(g(y)) ≤ log(h(λx + (1− λ)y))
for all x, y, and denote by αf and αg the maximizing processes when the above
representation is applied to log f and log g, respectively. Then we have
λ log
(∫
f dγn
)
+ (1− λ) log
(∫
g dγn
)
= λE
[
log f
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αft dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
‖αft ‖2 dt
]
+ (1− λ)E
[
log g
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αgt dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
‖αgt ‖2 dt
]
≤ E
[
log h
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
(λαft + (1− λ)αgt ) dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
‖λαft + (1 − λ)αgt ‖2 dt
]
≤ log
(∫
h dγn
)
.
Log-concavity follows readily by choosing f = 1A, g = 1B, and h = 1λA+(1−λ)B.
The beauty of this stochastic approach is that it reduces log-concavity of Gaussian
measures to a trivial fact, viz. convexity of the function x 7→ ‖x‖2. This idea has
been further developed in [29, 30, 13] to prove various other inequalities, some of
which do not seem to be readily accessible by other methods.
It is tempting to approach Ehrhard’s inequality by seeking a Gaussian improve-
ment of the Gibbs variational principle. It is far from clear, however, why this
should be possible. The Gibbs variational principle is not a mysterious result: it
simply expresses Fenchel duality for the convex functional f 7→ log(∫ efdγn). On
the other hand, classical results of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [23, §3.16] imply
that the functional f 7→ Φ−1(∫ Φ(f) dγn) cannot be convex.
In his proof of Ehrhard’s inequality [8], Borell circumvents the lack of a repre-
sentation formula by using partial differential equation methods. As a first step,
he obtains a PDE for the transformation vf (t, x) := Φ
−1(uf (t, x)) of the solution
uf(t, x) of the heat equation with initial condition f (the latter arises naturally in
this setting as the Markov semigroup of Brownian motion). It is not immediately
obvious that the resulting nonlinear PDE, given in section 2.2 below, possesses any
useful convexity properties. Instead, Borell considers directly the desired combi-
nation C(t, x, y) := λvf (t, x) + (1 − λ)vg(t, y) − vh(t, λx + (1 − λ)y), and observes
that a fortuitous cancellation occurs: one can arrange the terms in the combined
PDEs for vf , vg, vh to obtain a parabolic PDE for C alone. This makes it possible
to apply the parabolic maximum principle to deduce nonpositivity of C, which is
essentially the statement of Ehrhard’s inequality in its functional form.
1.2. The Borell-Ehrhard game. The main result of the present paper is a new
stochastic representation formula that lies at the heart of Ehrhard’s inequality, in
direct analogy with Borell’s stochastic approach to log-concavity. T
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provides significant insight into the mechanism behind the convexity properties of
Gaussian measures, as well as a new tool to study such properties.
As was explained above, the lack of convexity of f 7→ Φ−1(∫ Φ(f) dγn) prohibits
us from obtaining a representation formula by a convex duality argument. Instead,
our main result shows that this functional can be represented by a minimax varia-
tional principle. An informal statement of our main result is as follows.
Theorem (informal statement). For bounded and uniformly continuous f
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
=
sup
α
inf
β
E
[∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈αt, βt〉 dt+ e− 12
∫ 1
0
‖βt‖
2dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)]
.
This expression can be interpreted as the value of a zero-sum stochastic game
between two players. The first player can apply a force αt at time t to the underlying
Brownian motion. The second player cannot affect the dynamics of the Brownian
motion, but can instead choose to end the game prematurely: her control βt is the
rate of termination of the game at time t (that is, the game ends prematurely in the
interval [t, t+dt) with probability ‖βt‖2dt). The remarkable feature of this game is
that the running cost 〈αt, βt〉 is not quadratic, as in the stochastic representation
used to prove log-concavity, but rather linear in α. This reflects the fact that the
Φ−1 transformation lies precisely at the border of where we can expect convexity
to appear: it “linearizes” the quadratic cost that arises from the Gibbs variational
principle. (It is pointed out in [13] that log-concavity of γn can be strengthened in
a different sense by exploiting uniform convexity of the quadratic cost.)
As is typical in the theory of continuous-time games, it is essential to carefully
define the information structure available to each player in order for the above
stochastic representation to be valid. In section 2, we provide a precise formulation
and proof of our main result. The essential observation behind the proof is that
our stochastic game is closely connected to Borell’s PDE approach to Ehrhard’s
inequality: the nonlinear heat equation of Borell can be identified as the Bellman-
Isaacs equation [34, 19] for the value of our stochastic game. This observation leads
not only to the above representation, but also reveals the reason behind the hidden
convexity that appears somewhat mysteriously in Borell’s proof.
With the above stochastic representation in hand, it is a simple exercise to deduce
Ehrhard’s inequality, and its generalizations due to Borell, in complete analogy to
the stochastic proof of log-concavity. This exercise is carried out in section 3.
1.3. A Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality. As an illustration of the
power of the stochastic approach, we will use it to obtain a Gaussian improvement
of the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality of Barthe [3, 5]. Let us first recall Barthe’s
inequality in its Brunn-Minkowski form (see section 4 for the functional form).
Let E1, . . . , Ek be linear subspaces of R
n with dim(Ei) = ni. Denote by Pi the
orthogonal projection on Ei, and let λ1, . . . , λk ≥ 0 be such that λ1P1+· · ·+λkPk =
In. Then Barthe’s inequality states that for any Borel sets Ai ⊆ Ei, we have
λ1 log(γn1(A1)) + · · ·+ λk log(γnk(Ak)) ≤ log(γn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk)),
where we identify γni with the standard Gaussian measure on Ei. This is an exten-
sion of the log-concavity property where the sets Ai may lie in lower-dimensional
subspaces of the ambient space (in which case log-concavity is a trivial statement).
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In view of Ehrhard’s inequality, one might hope that it is possible to replace the
logarithm by Φ−1 in Barthe’s inequality to obtain a Gaussian improvement. How-
ever, this is certainly impossible in general: if E1, . . . , Ek are orthogonal subspaces
that span Rn, then Barthe’s inequality is in fact equality for all choices of Ai and
no Gaussian improvement is possible (see section 4.1). Nonetheless, it is possible
to systematically improve Barthe’s inequality in the Gaussian setting, as we will do
in section 4. To this end, define for every c ∈ (0, 1) the function
Φ−1c (x) := Φ
−1(cx)− Φ−1(c).
We will show in section 4 that, under the same assumptions as in Barthe’s inequality,
λ1Φ
−1
c (γn1(A1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (γnk(Ak)) ≤ Φ−1c (γn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk))
for every c ∈ (0, 1). From this inequality, one can recover both Barthe’s inequality
(c ↓ 0) and Ehrhard’s inequality (c ↑ 1) as special cases. The stochastic game
approach was essential to discovering the correct formulation of this inequality.
1.4. Generalized means. While our main result sheds new light on the mecha-
nism behind Ehrhard’s inequality, there remains some residual mystery regarding
the origin of this stochastic game. The stochastic representation used to prove
log-concavity is entirely natural, as it arises simply as a specialization of the Gibbs
variational principle to the Brownian setting. It is unclear, however, whether there
exists a natural minimax generalization of the Gibbs variational principle that can
provide an analogous explanation for the Borell-Ehrhard game.
From another perspective, however, there is nothing particularly surprising about
the stochastic representations that we encountered so far. To place these results in a
broader context, we can consider the more general functional f 7→ F−1(∫ F (f) dγn)
for any strictly increasing function F . Such functionals, called generalized means,
were studied by Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [23, chapter 3], who provide in par-
ticular necessary and sufficient conditions for such functionals to be convex. In
section 5, we will show that any convex generalized mean admits a stochastic rep-
resentation that is very similar to the special case F (x) = ex, from which convexity
can be immediately read off. Moreover, we will argue that essentially arbitrary
choice of F will admit a stochastic game representation, so the appearance of a
game in the case F (x) = Φ(x) is just one specific example. Of course, it is a special
feature of this example that gave rise to Ehrhard’s inequality; the potential utility
of such representations in other contexts will depend on the problem at hand.
2. The Borell-Ehrhard game
2.1. Setting and main result. Let (Ω,F , {Ft},P) be a probability space with a
complete and right-continuous filtration, and let {Wt} be a standard n-dimensional
Ft-Brownian motion. We denote by γn the standard Gaussian measure on Rn and
by Φ(x) := γ1((−∞, x]). Our main result is a variational principle for Gaussian
measures that will be expressed as a stochastic game for the Brownian motion W .
As is often the case in continuous time games, it is important to carefully define
what information is available to each player. Informally, we can view our game
as the continuous time limit of a discrete time game where two players take turns
exercising some control on the underlying Brownian motion. We denote the controls
of the first and second players at time t by αt and βt, respectively. As the second
player comes after the first, her control may depend on the choice of control of the
6 RAMON VAN HANDEL
first player. Conversely, the control of the first player may depend on the choice
of control of the second player in earlier turns. It is not entirely obvious how this
information structure should be encoded when time is continuous.
For our purposes, it will be convenient to adopt an approach due to Elliott and
Kalton [15, 19]. In this framework, the second player may choose any control.
Definition 2.1. A control is a progressively measurable n-dimensional process
β = {βt}t∈[0,1]. Denote by C the family of all controls such that E[
∫ 1
0
‖βs‖2ds] <∞.
On the other hand, the action of the first player must explicitly account for the
fact that she has access to the earlier choice of control of the second player. To this
end, we introduce the notion of an (Elliott-Kalton) strategy.
Definition 2.2. A strategy is a map α : C → C such that for every t ∈ [0, 1] and
β, β′ ∈ C such that βs(ω) = β′s(ω) for a.e. (s, ω) ∈ [0, t] × Ω, we have αs(β)(ω) =
αs(β
′)(ω) for a.e. (s, ω) ∈ [0, t] × Ω. Denote by S the family of all strategies such
that sup{E[∫ 10 ‖αs(β)‖2ds] : E[∫ 10 ‖βs‖2ds] ≤ R} <∞ for all R <∞.
In the Elliott-Kalton approach, the second player chooses any control β ∈ C,
while the first player’s control α(β) is defined by a strategy α ∈ S. The definition
of a strategy ensures that the control of the first player depends causally on the
control of the second player, thereby encoding the desired information structure.
With these formalities out of the way, we can now formulate our main result.
Theorem 2.3. Let f : Rn → R be bounded and uniformly continuous, and define
Jf [α, β] := E
[∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈αt, βt〉 dt+ e− 12
∫ 1
0
‖βt‖
2dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)]
for α, β ∈ C. Then
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
= sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jf [α(β), β] = inf
α∈S
sup
β∈C
Jf [α(β), β].
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.3. The
connection with geometric inequalities will be developed in sections 3 and 4 below.
2.2. The Borell PDE. Throughout the proof, we will assume without loss of gen-
erality that f is bounded, smooth, and has bounded derivatives of all orders. Once
the result is proved in this case, the conclusion is readily extended to functions
f that are only bounded and uniformly continuous (as the latter can be approxi-
mated in the uniform topology by smooth functions with bounded derivatives by
convolution with a smooth compactly supported kernel, cf. [20, §8.2]).
Define for (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× Rn the function
u(t, x) := E[Φ(f(W1 −Wt + x))],
so that u solves the heat equation
∂u
∂t
+
1
2
∆u = 0, u(1, x) = Φ(f(x)).
Define
v(t, x) := Φ−1(u(t, x)).
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By the smoothness assumption on f and elementary properties of the heat equation,
u and therefore v are bounded, smooth, and have bounded derivatives of all orders
on [0, 1]× Rn. Moreover, it is readily verified that v satisfies
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
∆v − 1
2
v‖∇v‖2 = 0, v(1, x) = f(x).
This equation was introduced by Borell [8] in his study of the Ehrhard inequality.
The following simple observation contains the main idea behind the proof of The-
orem 2.3: the nonlinear term in Borell’s PDE admits a variational interpretation.
Lemma 2.4. Let c be a constant such that 2c ≥ supx f(x). Then
−1
2
v‖∇v‖2 = sup
a∈Rn
inf
b∈Rn
{
〈a+ cb,∇v + b〉 − 1
2
v‖b‖2
}
,
where the optimizer a∗ = (c− v)∇v, b∗ = −∇v is a saddle point.
Proof. Define for a, b ∈ Rn the objective
H(a, b) := 〈a+ cb,∇v + b〉 − 1
2
v‖b‖2.
Then it is readily verified that
H(a, b∗) = −1
2
v‖∇v‖2, H(a∗, b) = 1
2
(2c− v)‖b+∇v‖2 − 1
2
v‖∇v‖2.
But note that as 2c ≥ f , we have 2c− v ≥ 0 by the definition of v. Therefore
sup
a
inf
b
H(a, b) ≤ sup
a
H(a, b∗) = −1
2
v‖∇v‖2 = inf
b
H(a∗, b) ≤ sup
a
inf
b
H(a, b),
and the proof is complete. 
Lemma 2.4 reveals that the partial differential equation satisfied by v is none
other than the Bellman-Isaacs equation for the value of a stochastic game [19, 34].
We can now proceed along mostly standard lines to formalize this idea.
2.3. Upper bound. Fix 2c ≥ f , and consider the stochastic differential equation
dXβt = (c− v(t,Xβt ))∇v(t,Xβt ) dt+ cβt dt+ dWt, Xβ0 = 0
for β ∈ C. As the function (c − v)∇v is smooth with bounded derivatives, this
equation has a unique strong solution Xβ [32, Theorem 4.8]. Define
α∗t (β) := (c− v(t,Xβt ))∇v(t,Xβt ).
Then evidently α∗(β) ∈ C (in fact, it is uniformly bounded) and α∗ depends causally
on β. Thus we have shown that α∗ ∈ S defines an Elliott-Kalton strategy.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to the process e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2dsv(t,Xβt ) gives∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈α∗t (β) + cβt, βt〉 dt+ e−
1
2
∫
1
0
‖βt‖
2dtf(Xβ1 ) =
v(0, 0) +
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈∇v(t,Xβt ), dWt〉
+
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds
{
∂v
∂t
(t,Xβt ) +
1
2
∆v(t,Xβt )
+ 〈α∗t (β) + cβt,∇v(t,Xβt ) + βt〉 −
1
2
v(t,Xβt )‖βt‖2
}
dt.
8 RAMON VAN HANDEL
We now observe that the last integral in this expression is nonnegative by Borell’s
PDE and Lemma 2.4. Moreover, the Brownian integral is a martingale as ∇v is
bounded. Therefore, taking the expectation of this expression, we obtain
v(0, 0) ≤ E
[ ∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈α∗t (β) + cβt, βt〉 dt+ e−
1
2
∫ 1
0
‖βt‖
2dtf(Xβ1 )
]
= Jf [α
∗(β) + cβ, β]
for every β ∈ C. But evidently α˜∗(β) := α∗(β) + cβ defines another Elliott-Kalton
strategy α˜∗ ∈ S. We therefore readily obtain the upper bound in Theorem 2.3
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
= v(0, 0) ≤ sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jf [α(β), β].
2.4. Lower bound. For the proof of the lower bound, fix any α ∈ S. Given this
strategy, our aim is to construct a control β ∈ C that nearly minimizes Jf [α(β), β].
We will do this by imitating the idea that our continuous game is the limit of
discrete-time games, as was explained informally at the beginning of this section.
To this end, fix a time step δ = N−1 (N ≥ 1). For t ∈ [0, δ), let βt := −∇v(0, 0).
We now iteratively extend the definition of β as follows. Suppose that β has been
defined on the interval [0, kδ). Then αt(β) is uniquely defined for a.e. t ∈ [0, kδ)
(as α is causal by the definition of an Elliott-Kalton strategy). Writing
Xt := Wt +
∫ t
0
αs(β) ds,
we define βt := −∇v(kδ,Xkδ) for t ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ). Iterating this process N − 1
times results in a control β ∈ C that is uniquely defined a.e. in [0, 1]× Ω.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2dsv(t,Xt) as in the upper bound gives
Jf [α(β), β] = v(0, 0) +E[Γ]
where
Γ :=
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds
{
1
2
v(t,Xt)(‖∇v(t,Xt)‖2−‖βt‖2)+〈αt(β),∇v(t,Xt)+βt〉
}
dt.
As v is bounded and has bounded derivatives of all orders, we can estimate
Γ ≤ C1
∫ 1
0
(1 + ‖αt(β)‖)‖∇v(t,Xt) + βt‖ dt
= C1
N−1∑
k=0
∫ (k+1)δ
kδ
(1 + ‖αt(β)‖)‖∇v(t,Xt)−∇v(kδ,Xkδ)‖ dt
≤ C2
N−1∑
k=0
∫ (k+1)δ
kδ
(1 + ‖αt(β)‖)(δ + ‖Xt −Xkδ‖) dt
for constants C1, C2 that depend on f only. Note that for t ≤ (k + 1)δ
‖Xt −Xkδ‖ ≤ ‖Wt −Wkδ‖+
√
δ
[ ∫ t
kδ
‖αs(β)‖2 ds
]1/2
.
We can therefore estimate using Cauchy-Schwarz
E[Γ] ≤ C3
√
δ
(
1 +E
[ ∫ 1
0
‖αt(β)‖2dt
])
≤ C3(K + 1)
√
δ,
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where K := sup{E[∫ 10 ‖αt(β′)‖2dt] : ‖β′‖∞ ≤ ‖∇v‖∞} <∞ by definition as α ∈ S
and where C3 depends only on f . We have therefore shown that
inf
β′∈C
Jf [α(β
′), β′] ≤ Jf [α(β), β] ≤ v(0, 0) + C3(K + 1)
√
δ.
As δ > 0 and α ∈ S were arbitrary, we readily conclude that
sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jf [α(β), β] ≤ v(0, 0) = Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
.
2.5. End of proof. Combining the upper and lower bound, we have shown
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
= sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jf [α(β), β].
It remains to prove the second identity in Theorem 2.3. To this end, note that
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(f) dγn
)
= −Φ−1
(∫
Φ(−f) dγn
)
= − sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
J−f [α(β), β]
as Φ(−x) = 1− Φ(x). But we can write
− sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
J−f [α(β), β] = inf
α∈S
sup
β∈C
(−J−f [α(β), β]) = inf
α∈S
sup
β∈C
Jf [α(β),−β].
As C is invariant under the transformation β 7→ −β and S is invariant under the
transformation α(β) 7→ α(−β), the second identity in Theorem 2.3 follows.
3. The Ehrhard and Borell inequalities
The aim of this short section is to show that the classical Gaussian Brunn-
Minkowski inequality of Ehrhard [14, 8] and its generalizations due to Borell [9, 10]
arise as immediate corollaries of Theorem 2.3. In section 4 below, we will extend
this approach to derive new geometric inequalities for Gaussian measures.
3.1. Ehrhard’s inequality. Ehrhard’s inequality states that
λΦ−1(γn(A)) + (1 − λ)Φ−1(γn(B)) ≤ Φ−1(γn(λA + (1− λ)B))
for all Borel setsA,B ⊆ Rn and λ ∈ [0, 1]. By approximating the indicator functions
of A and B by smooth functions, it is routine to deduce this inequality from the
following functional form of the result (see [8] or section 4.4 below).
Corollary 3.1 ([14, 8]). Let λ ∈ [0, 1], and let f, g, h be uniformly continuous
functions with values in [ε, 1− ε] for some ε > 0. Suppose that for all x, y ∈ Rn
λΦ−1(f(x)) + (1− λ)Φ−1(g(y)) ≤ Φ−1(h(λx + (1− λ)y)).
Then
λΦ−1
(∫
f dγn
)
+ (1− λ)Φ−1
(∫
g dγn
)
≤ Φ−1
(∫
h dγn
)
.
Proof. Fix δ > 0, and choose near-optimal αf , αg ∈ S and βh ∈ C such that
sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
JΦ−1(f)[α(β), β] ≤ inf
β∈C
JΦ−1(f)[αf (β), β] + δ,
sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
JΦ−1(g)[α(β), β] ≤ inf
β∈C
JΦ−1(g)[αg(β), β] + δ,
JΦ−1(h)[λαf (βh) + (1 − λ)αg(βh), βh] ≤ inf
β∈C
JΦ−1(h)[λαf (β) + (1− λ)αg(β), β] + δ.
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Then by Theorem 2.3
λΦ−1
(∫
f dγn
)
+ (1 − λ)Φ−1(∫ g dγn)
≤ λJΦ−1(f)[αf (βh), βh] + (1− λ)JΦ−1(g)[αg(βh), βh] + 2δ
≤ JΦ−1(h)[λαf (βh) + (1 − λ)αg(βh), βh] + 2δ
≤ Φ−1(∫ h dγn)+ 3δ,
and the proof is completed by letting δ ↓ 0. 
3.2. Borell’s Gaussian Brunn-Minkowski inequalities. In [9], Borell proves
a substantial generalization of Ehrhard’s inequaliy: he shows that
λΦ−1(γn(A)) + µΦ
−1(γn(B)) ≤ Φ−1(γn(λA+ µB))
holds for all Borel sets A,B ⊆ Rn if and only if λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1 (the
necessity of the latter conditions is easily verified by explicit examples, see [9]). The
deduction of this result from Theorem 2.3 requires only a minor modification of the
proof of Corollary 3.1: it suffices to note that we do not need to choose the same
Brownian motion W in the variational problems for f and g. By choosing instead
two correlated Brownian motions, we immediately recover Borell’s result.
Corollary 3.2 ([9]). Let λ, µ ≥ 0, and let f, g, h be uniformly continuous functions
with values in [ε, 1− ε] for some ε > 0. Suppose that for all x, y ∈ Rn
λΦ−1(f(x)) + µΦ−1(g(y)) ≤ Φ−1(h(λx + µy)).
If λ+ µ ≥ 1 and |λ− µ| ≤ 1, then
λΦ−1
(∫
f dγn
)
+ µΦ−1
(∫
g dγn
)
≤ Φ−1
(∫
h dγn
)
.
Proof. Let ρ = (1 − λ2 − µ2)/2λµ. The assumptions λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1
guarantee that ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. We can therefore define two standard n-dimensional
Brownian motions {Wt} and {W˜t} with quadratic covariation 〈W i, W˜ j〉t = ρtδij .
The point of this construction is that the process {W¯t} defined as W¯t := λWt+µW˜t
is again a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion.
Let J˜f , J¯f be defined analogously to Jf in Theorem 2.3 where {Wt} is replaced
by {W˜t} and {W¯t}, respectively. The remainder of the proof is identical to that of
Corollary 3.1, where JΦ−1(g) is replaced by J˜Φ−1(g) and JΦ−1(h) by J¯Φ−1(h). 
Remark 3.3. We observe that it was essential for the success of the proof of
Corollary 3.2 that the game described by Theorem 2.3 is defined on a general
probability space: while the objective function Jf [α, β] depends only on a single
Brownian motion {Wt}, we allowed the controls α, β ∈ C to be adapted to a larger
filtration {Ft} that is not necessarily generated by the underlying Brownian motion
alone. This freedom was used crucially in the proof of Corollary 3.2; here we can
take Ft to be (the augmentation of) σ{Ws, W˜s : s ≤ t}, but we cannot ensure that
the control λαf (βh) + µαg(βh) will depend only on {W¯t}.
The assumptions λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1 in Corollary 3.2 are precisely
the conditions required for the existence of correlated standard Brownian motions
{W1,t} and {W2,t} such that λW1+µW2 is also a standard Brownian motion. Along
identical lines, we immediately see that the inequality
λ1Φ
−1(γn(A1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1(γn(Ak)) ≤ Φ−1(γn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk))
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holds for all Borel sets A1, . . . , Ak ⊆ Rn whenever there exist correlated standard
Brownian motions {Wi,t}, i = 1, . . . , k such that λ1W1 + · · · + λkWk is again a
standard Brownian motion. The family of coefficients λ1, . . . , λk ≥ 0 for which this
is the case is characterized by [5, Lemma 3], and we recover in this manner the
general Gaussian Brunn-Minkowski inequality of Borell [10].
Remark 3.4. We have stated Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 for simplicity under the as-
sumption that the functions f, g, h are uniformly continuous and bounded away
from zero and one. This case contains the main difficulty of the problem: it is
routine to derive from this the corresponding results for sets [8], and one can subse-
quently derive versions of Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 where the functions f, g, h are just
Borel measurable with values in [0, 1] as is explained in [27]. As these are standard
results, we omit the details. However, in section 4.4 below, we will work out in
detail a direct approximation argument in the setting of Theorem 4.2 that could
also be applied here to deduce the measurable versions of Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2.
4. A Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality
4.1. Barthe’s inequality. Both the classical Brunn-Minkowski inequality and
Ehrhard’s inequality bound the measure of the Minkowski sum λA + (1 − λ)B
from below in terms of the measures of A and B. Therefore, when either A or B
has measure zero, these inequalities necessarily become trivial. Nonetheless, it is
perfectly possible for λA + (1 − λ)B to have positive measure even when A and
B are, for example, contained in lower-dimensional subspaces of Rn. This phe-
nomenon is captured quantitatively by a significant generalization of the classical
Brunn-Minkowski inequality due to Barthe [3], which we presently recall.
Fix λ1, . . . , λk ≥ 0, and let B1, . . . , Bk be linear maps Bi : Rn → Rni such that
k∑
i=1
λiB
∗
iBi = In, BiB
∗
i = Ini for all i.
Note that B∗i isometrically embeds R
ni in the linear subspace Ei = Im(B
∗
i ) of R
n.
Let fi : R
ni → R and h : Rn → R be functions such that
λ1 log(f1(x1)) + · · ·+ λk log(fk(xk)) ≤ log(h(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk))
for all xi ∈ Rni . Then Barthe’s inequality states that
λ1 log
(∫
f1 dγn1
)
+ · · ·+ λk log
(∫
fk dγnk
)
≤ log
(∫
h dγn
)
(see [5, 30] for the formulation in terms of Gaussian rather than Lebesgue measure).
When fi are taken to be indicator functions of sets, this reduces to the following
generalization of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality: for any Borel sets Ai ⊆ Ei
λ1 log(γn1(A1)) + · · ·+ λk log(γnk(Ak)) ≤ log(γn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk)),
where we implicitly identify γni with the standard Gaussian measure on Ei.
Remark 4.1. Barthe’s inequality is also called the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequal-
ity. The classical Brascamp-Lieb inequality is an analogous multilinear generaliza-
tion of Ho¨lder’s inequality. Just as the Pre´kopa-Leindler inequality could formally
be viewed as a reverse form of Ho¨lder’s inequality, Barthe’s inequality can be viewed
as a reverse form of the Brascamp-Lieb inequality. Let us note that we have stated
the inequality in its “geometric” form, which is most natural for our purposes. The
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general form of the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality (for general matrices Bi) can
be deduced from the geometric form, see [6] and [30] for details.
When ni = n and Bi = In for all i, Barthe’s inequality reduces to the Pre´kopa-
Leindler inequality. However, we know that the latter is far from optimal for Gauss-
ian measures: the sharp form of the Pre´kopa-Leindler inequality in the Gaussian
case is precisely Ehrhard’s inequality (Corollary 3.1), where the logarithm is re-
placed by Φ−1. It is therefore natural to ask whether there exists an analogous
Gaussian improvement of Barthe’s inequality. This question was raised in [5, §4.2].
We will show in section 4.2 that there does in fact exist an interesting family of
inequalities of this form, but the correct formulation of such inequalities is not en-
tirely obvious. Before we develop these inequalities, let us briefly discuss what sort
of improvement could reasonably be expected.
One might optimistically hope that as in the case of Ehrhard’s inequality, we may
simply replace log by Φ−1 in Barthe’s inequality to obtain the analogus Gaussian
form. However, not only is this impossible, but in fact no improvement of Barthe’s
inequality is possible in general. To see why, consider the case where E1 and E2 are
two orthogonal subspaces of R2, which forces λ1 = λ2 = 1. Suppose the inequality
L(γ1(A1)) + L(γ1(A2)) ≤ L(γ2(A1 +A2))
holds for a function L. As γ2(A1 +A2) = γ1(A1)γ1(A2) in this case, we must have
L(x) + L(y) ≤ L(xy)
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], which is clearly violated when L(x) = Φ−1(x) (let x = y = 12 ).
On the other hand, the above inequality holds with equality when L(x) = log x.
It follows that Barthe’s inequality is already optimal in the orthogonal setting and
cannot be improved by any alternative choice of function L.
We have now considered two extreme cases. When E1 = · · · = Ek = Rn,
Ehrhard’s inequality is sharp and the optimal choice of function is L = Φ−1. On
the other hand, when E1, . . . , Ek are orthogonal subspaces, Barthe’s inequality is
sharp and the optimal choice of function is L = log. One can therefore not expect
that any single choice of function L can provide a systematic Gaussian refinement
of Barthe’s inequality: any general improvement requires the choice of L to depend
at least on the parameters λi and Bi. This feature is integral to the formulation of
the Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequalities that we will prove presently: we
will introduce a family of inequalities that interpolate, in some sense, between the
Ehrhard and Barthe inequalities; the best choice of inequality within this family
must depend on the parameters to which it is applied.
4.2. A Gaussian refinement. In the remainder of this section, we place ourselves
in the same setting as in the above formulation of Barthe’s inequality: that is, we
fix λ1, . . . , λk ≥ 0 and let B1, . . . , Bk be linear maps Bi : Rn → Rni such that
k∑
i=1
λiB
∗
iBi = In, BiB
∗
i = Ini for all i.
As before, we define the subspaces Ei = Im(B
∗
i ). We also define the function
Φ−1c (x) := Φ
−1(cx)− Φ−1(c), x ∈ [0, 1]
for c ∈ (0, 1). We will prove the following Gaussian form of Barthe’s inequality.
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Theorem 4.2. Let c ∈ (0, 1), and let f1, . . . , fk, h be Borel measurable functions
fi : R
ni → R, h : Rn → R with values in [0, 1]. Suppose that
λ1Φ
−1
c (f1(x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (fk(xk)) ≤ Φ−1c (h(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk))
for all xi ∈ Rni . Then
λ1Φ
−1
c
(∫
f1 dγn1
)
+ · · ·+ λkΦ−1c
(∫
fk dγnk
)
≤ Φ−1c
(∫
h dγn
)
.
We immediately deduce the following generalization of Ehrhard’s inequality.
Corollary 4.3. For any c ∈ (0, 1) and Borel sets Ai ⊆ Ei, i = 1, . . . , k, we have
λ1Φ
−1
c (γn1(A1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (γnk(Ak)) ≤ Φ−1c (γn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk)).
Proof. Choose fi(x) = 1Ai(B
∗
i x) and h(x) = 1λ1A1+···+λkAk(x). 
It is instructive to note that both Ehrhard’s inequality and Barthe’s generalized
Brunn-Minkowski inequality arise as limiting cases of Corollary 4.3.
Let us first recover Barthe’s inequality. To this end, recall that
Φ(−y) =
∫ ∞
y
e−z
2/2
√
2pi
dz = (1 + o(1))
e−y
2/2
y
√
2pi
as y →∞.
A simple computation shows that
Φ−1(x)2 = −2 logx− log log(1/x)− log 4pi + o(1) as x ↓ 0,
so that
Φ−1c (x) =
Φ−1(cx)2 − Φ−1(c)2
Φ−1(c) + Φ−1(cx)
=
−2 logx+ o(1)
Φ−1(c) + Φ−1(cx)
as c ↓ 0.
This implies, in particular, that
lim
c↓0
Φ−1c (x)
√
−2 log c = log x.
Thus Barthe’s Brunn-Minkowski inequality is recovered as c ↓ 0 in Corollary 4.3.
On the other hand, to recover Ehrhard’s inequality, set ni = n and Bi = In for
all i. This forces λ1 + · · ·+ λk = 1, so that Corollary 4.3 reduces to
λ1Φ
−1(cγn(A1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1(cγn(Ak)) ≤ Φ−1(cγn(λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk)).
Thus Ehrhard’s inequality is recovered as c ↑ 1 in Corollary 4.3.
We have therefore seen that Corollary 4.3 is never worse than Barthe’s Brunn-
Minkowski inequality, and can be substantially better. For general parameters, one
has the freedom to optimize over c to obtain the best inequality in this family.
4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.2: smooth case. The main idea that is needed in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 is the following minor extension of Theorem 2.3.
Proposition 4.4. Let f : Rm → (−∞, 0] be bounded and uniformly continuous, let
c ∈ (0, 1), and let B : Rn → Rm be a linear map such that BB∗ = Im. Define
JB,cf [α, β] := E
[ ∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds〈B∗Bαt, βt〉 dt
+ e−
1
2
∫ 1
0
‖βt‖
2dtf
(
BW1 +
∫ 1
0
Bαt dt+
Φ−1(c)
2
∫ 1
0
Bβt dt
)]
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for α, β ∈ C. Then we have
Φ−1c
(∫
Φc(f) dγm
)
= sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
JB,cf [α(β), β].
Proof. We begin by noting that, by the definition of Φ−1c , we can write
Φ−1c
(∫
Φc(f) dγm
)
= Φ−1
(∫
Φ(Φ−1(c) + f ◦B) dγn
)
− Φ−1(c),
where we used that B is a projection (so that γm = γnB
−1).
Define g := Φ−1(c) + f ◦B. As f ≤ 0, we have g ≤ Φ−1(c). Following verbatim
the proof of the upper bound of Theorem 2.3, we have
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(g) dγn
)
≤ Jg[α∗(β) + 12Φ−1(c)β, β]
for all β ∈ C, where α∗ ∈ S is a strategy of the form
α∗t (β) = (
1
2Φ
−1(c)− v(t,Xβt ))∇v(t,Xβt ), v(t, x) = Φ−1(E[Φ(g(W1 −Wt+ x))])
for a suitably defined random process Xβ. The crucial observation at this point is
that as ∇g(x) = B∗∇f(Bx), we have ∇v(t, x) ∈ Im(B∗) for all t, x. In particular,
the optimal strategy α∗ satisfies B∗Bα∗(β) = α∗(β) for every β ∈ C. Therefore
Φ−1
(∫
Φ(g) dγn
)
≤ sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jg[B
∗Bα(β) + 12Φ
−1(c)β, β].
On the other hand, the corresponding lower bound follows immediately from Theo-
rem 2.3 (as strategies of the form B∗Bα(β)+ 12Φ
−1(c)β form a subset of all possible
strategies S). Putting everything together, we have now shown that
Φ−1c
(∫
Φc(f) dγm
)
= sup
α∈S
inf
β∈C
Jg[B
∗Bα(β) + 12Φ
−1(c)β, β] − Φ−1(c).
To complete the proof, it suffices to note that
Jg[B
∗Bα+ 12Φ
−1(c)β, β] − Φ−1(c)
= JB,cf [α, β] + Φ
−1(c)E
[
1
2
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖βs‖
2ds‖βt‖2 dt+ e− 12
∫
1
0
‖βt‖
2dt − 1
]
= JB,cf [α, β],
where we used the fundamental theorem of calculus. 
With Proposition 4.4 in hand, we immediately obtain:
Corollary 4.5. Theorem 4.2 is valid under the additional assumption that the
functions f1, . . . , fk, h are uniformly continuous with values in [ε, 1] for some ε > 0.
The proof is identical to that of Corollary 3.1, and we omit the details.
Remark 4.6. Corollary 4.3 can be deduced directly from Corollary 4.5 by intro-
ducing smooth approximations of the indicator functions of the sets A1, . . . , Ak and
λ1A1 + · · ·+ λkAk. Such an argument is given in [8], and can be readily applied in
the present setting. We therefore do not need the full strength of Theorem 4.2 to
deduce Corollary 4.3. However, while the proof of Theorem 4.2 requires a bit more
work, it yields a result that is potentially of broader utility.
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4.4. Proof of Theorem 4.2: general case. The important part Theorem 4.2
is already contained in Corollary 4.5 above. The remaining arguments in the
proof of Theorem 4.2 are technical: we must approximate the measurable func-
tions f1, . . . , fk, h by uniformly continuous functions so that Corollary 4.5 can be
applied. The requisite approximation arguments are worked out in this section.
(Closely related approximation arguments can also be found in [13].)
We begin by proving Theorem 4.2 in the case that f1, . . . , fk and h are upper-
semicontinuous. The following lemma makes it possible to approximate upper-
semicontinuous functions by uniformly continuous functions without violating the
assumption of Theorem 4.2, so that Corollary 4.5 can be applied.
Lemma 4.7. Let f1, . . . , fk, h be upper-semicontinuous functions fi : R
ni → R,
h : Rn → R with values in [ε, 1] for some ε > 0. Let c ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that
λ1Φ
−1
c (f1(x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (fk(xk)) ≤ Φ−1c (h(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk))
for all xi ∈ Rni . Then there exist for every s > 0 uniformly continuous functions
f s1 , . . . , f
s
k , h
s with values in [ε, 1] such that
λ1Φ
−1
c (f
s
1 (x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (f sk (xk)) ≤ Φ−1c (hs(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk))
for all xi ∈ Rni , and such that f si → fi and hs → h pointwise as s ↓ 0.
Proof. Define f si and h
s by the sup-convolutions
Φ−1c (f
s
i (x)) := sup
y∈Rni
{Φ−1c (fi(y))− s−1‖x− y‖},
Φ−1c (h
s(x)) := sup
y∈Rn
{Φ−1c (h(y))− s−1‖x− y‖}.
It is easily seen that f si , h
s take values in [ε, 1], and that Φ−1c (f
s
i ) and Φ
−1
c (h
s) are
s−1-Lipschitz; thus f si and h
s are certainly uniformly continuous. We now claim
that hs → h as s ↓ 0. To see this, choose for every s > 0 a point ys such that
Φ−1c (h
s(x)) ≤ Φ−1c (h(ys))− s−1‖x− ys‖+ s.
As hs ≥ ε and h ≤ 1, this evidently implies ‖x − ys‖ ≤ s2 − sΦ−1c (ε) for all s, so
that ys → x as s ↓ 0. But we can now estimate
Φ−1c (h(x)) ≤ lim inf
s↓0
Φ−1c (h
s(x)) ≤ lim sup
s↓0
Φ−1c (h
s(x))
≤ lim sup
s↓0
Φ−1c (h(ys)) ≤ Φ−1c (h(x)),
where we have used that h is upper-semicontinuous in the last line. This shows
that hs → h pointwise as s ↓ 0, and f si → fi follows identically. Finally, note that
λ1Φ
−1
c (f
s
1 (x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (f sk(xk))
= sup
y1,...,yk
{λ1Φ−1c (f1(y1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (fk(yk))
− s−1λ1‖x1 − y1‖ − · · · − s−1λk‖xk − yk‖}
≤ sup
y1,...,yk
{Φ−1c (h(λ1B∗1y1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kyk))
− s−1‖λ1B∗1(x1 − y1) + · · ·+ λkB∗k(xk − yk)‖}
≤ Φ−1c (hs(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk)),
where we have used that ‖B∗i z‖ = ‖z‖ for z ∈ Rni and the triangle inequality. 
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Using Lemma 4.7 and Corollary 4.5, we can now prove the following.
Corollary 4.8. Theorem 4.2 is valid under the additional assumption that the
functions f1, . . . , fk, h are upper-semicontinuous with values in [0, 1].
Proof. We first approximate f1, . . . , fk, h by functions that are bounded away from
zero. To this end, fix ε ∈ (0, 1) and let δ := maxiΦc(λiΦ−1c (ε)). Define the upper-
semicontinuous functions h¯ := h ∨ δ and f¯i := fi ∨ ε for all i. We claim that
λ1Φ
−1
c (f¯1(x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (f¯k(xk)) ≤ Φ−1c (h¯(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk)).
Indeed, if fi(xi) > ε for all i this follows from the assumption of Theorem 4.2, while
if fi(xi) ≤ ε for some i the left-hand side is at most Φ−1c (δ).
Applying Lemma 4.7, we can find uniformly continuous functions f¯ s1 , . . . , f¯
s
k , h¯
s
with values in [ε, 1] such that f¯ si → f¯i and h¯s → h¯ pointwise as s ↓ 0 and
λ1Φ
−1
c (f¯
s
1 (x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (f¯ sk (xk)) ≤ Φ−1c (h¯s(λ1B∗1x1 + · · ·+ λkB∗kxk))
for every s > 0. Corollary 4.5 implies
λ1Φ
−1
c
(∫
f¯ s1 dγn1
)
+ · · ·+ λkΦ−1c
(∫
f¯ sk dγnk
)
≤ Φ−1c
(∫
h¯s dγn
)
.
The conclusion follows using dominated convergence as s ↓ 0 and ε ↓ 0. 
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let f˜1, . . . , f˜k be upper-semicontinuous functions with com-
pact support and with values in [0, 1] such that f˜i ≤ fi for all i. Define h˜ by
Φ−1c (h˜(x)) := sup
λ1B∗1x1+···+λkB
∗
k
xk=x
{λ1Φ−1c (f˜1(x1)) + · · ·+ λkΦ−1c (f˜k(xk))}.
Then h˜ ≤ h by construction, and h˜ is also upper-semicontinuous [33, Prop. 1.27].
Moreover, the upper-semicontinuous functions f˜1, . . . , f˜k and h˜ clearly satisfy the
assumptions of Theorem 4.2. Therefore, Corollary 4.8 implies
λ1Φ
−1
c
(∫
f˜1 dγn1
)
+ · · ·+ λkΦ−1c
(∫
f˜k dγnk
)
≤ Φ−1c
(∫
h dγn
)
.
The conclusion now follows by taking the supremum on the left-hand side over all
compactly supported upper-semicontinuous functions f˜i ≤ fi [20, Prop. 7.14]. 
5. Generalized means
Unlike the logarithmic functional f 7→ log(∫ efdγn), whose stochastic represen-
tation has a natural interpretation through the Gibbs variational principle, the
emergence of a stochastic game representation for f 7→ Φ−1(∫ Φ(f) dγn) may ap-
pear rather unexpected. To provide some further insight into such representations,
we aim in this section to place the result of Theorem 2.3 in a broader context.
Throughout this section, let I ⊂ R be a compact interval, and let F : I → R be
a smooth function that is strictly increasing F ′ > 0. Following Hardy, Littlewood,
and Po´lya [23, chapter 3], we define the generalized mean MF as
MF (f) := F
−1
(∫
F (f) dγn
)
for any measurable function f : Rn → I. We will argue below that the generalized
mean MF admits a stochastic representation for any sufficiently regular function
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F : from this perspective, there is nothing particularly special about the specific
cases F (x) = ex and F (x) = Φ(x) that we encountered so far. Of course, the
potential utility of such stochastic representations in other settings depends on the
problem at hand. For example, to establish Brunn-Minkowski type inequalities, we
crucially exploited a special feature of the functions F (x) = ex and F (x) = Φ(x):
in both cases, the running cost in the stochastic representation proves to be a
concave function of the strategy that is being maximized over. While such structural
features of the representation are specific to particular choices of F , the existence
of a stochastic representation is not anything special in its own right.
In their study of generalized means, Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [23, §3.16] ob-
tained necessary and sufficient conditions for f 7→ MF (f) to be a convex functional.
In section 5.1, we will show that stochastic representations provide an interesting
perspective on this characterization: the conditions of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya
are precisely those that are needed to obtain a stochastic representation for MF
involving only a supremum (as in the case F (x) = ex). In particular, we can state
a very general expression for the stochastic representation in this setting, despite
that the Fenchel transform of MF (and therefore the natural analogue of the Gibbs
variational principle) rarely admits a tractable expression. For generalized means
that are not convex, we will outline in section 5.2 how one can obtain in this case a
stochastic game representation of MF under essentially no assumptions on F . As
the explicit expressions that define such games for general F do not provide much
insight, we do not state a general theorem, but rather illustrate by means of an
example how easily such representations can be obtained in practice.
5.1. The convex case. The following result due to Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya
characterizes precisely when the functional f 7→MF (f) is convex.
Theorem 5.1 ([23, §3.16]). The generalized mean functional f 7→MF (f) is convex
if and only if the function F is convex and the function F ′/F ′′ is concave.
Proof. The following facts are explicitly stated and proved in [23, §3.16]:
• Convexity of F is necessary for MF to be convex.
• If F is strictly convex F ′′ > 0, then concavity of F ′/F ′′ is necessary and
sufficient for MF to be convex.
For completeness, we spell out what happens when F is convex but fails to be
strictly convex. We should consider two separate cases:
• If F ′′ vanishes everywhere in I, then F is linear and convexity of MF is
trivial (note that in this case F ′/F ′′ ≡ +∞ is clearly concave).
• If F ′′ vanishes at some point but not everywhere in I, then F ′/F ′′ must
blow up to +∞ near that point as we assumed that F ′ > 0 and that F is
smooth. This implies there is a subinterval J ⊂ I on which F ′′ > 0 but
where F ′/F ′′ fails to be concave, so convexity of MF must fail.
We have therefore established all possible cases of Theorem 5.1. 
When F (x) = ex, the condition of Theorem 5.1 is evidently satisfied; in this
case, convexity of MF is simply the statement of Ho¨lder’s inequality. On the other
hand, when F (x) = Φ(x), the condition for convexity fails to be satisfied on any
interval I. In particular, while log-concavity could formally be viewed as a “reverse”
form of Ho¨lder’s inequality, there cannot exist a Gaussian improvement of Ho¨lder’s
inequality that is analogous to Ehrhard’s improvement of log-concavity.
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Remark 5.2. The proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that unless F is linear, convexity
of the functional MF requires that F is strictly convex F
′′ > 0 everywhere in I.
We will therefore assume the latter without loss of generality in our development
of stochastic representations for convex generalized means.
The relevance of the conditions of Theorem 5.1 is far from obvious at first sight.
We will presently see that these conditions arise in a very natural manner when we
attempt to obtain a stochastic representation for MF .
We begin by developing the argument of section 2.2 in the present setting. Let
f : Rn → I be a Lipschitz function and define for (t, x) ∈ [0, 1]× Rn
u(t, x) := E[F (f(W1 −Wt + x))],
so that u solves the heat equation. Define
v(t, x) := F−1(u(t, x)).
Note that as F is smooth and F ′ > 0, the function F−1 is smooth by the inverse
function theorem. Therefore, by elementary properties of the heat equation, v takes
values in I, is smooth and has bounded derivatives of all orders on [0, 1− ε]× Rn
for every ε > 0, and v(t, x)→ f(x) uniformly in x as t→ 1. Using
∂u
∂t
= F ′(v)
∂v
∂t
, ∆u = F ′(v)∆v + F ′′(v)‖∇v‖2
and the heat equation for u shows that v satisfies the PDE
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
∆v +
1
2
F ′′(v)
F ′(v)
‖∇v‖2 = 0, v(1, x) = f(x).
We now readily see the relevance of the conditions of Theorem 5.1: as the function
(x, y) 7→ ‖x‖2/y is convex for (x, y) ∈ Rn × R+, the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are
precisely those that ensure that the nonlinear term in this PDE is a convex function
of (∇v, v). In particular, we can express this term as follows.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose that F ′′ > 0 and that F ′/F ′′ is concave. Denote by R :=
(−F ′/F ′′)∗ the Fenchel transform of the convex function −F ′/F ′′. Then
1
2
F ′′(v)
F ′(v)
‖∇v‖2 = sup
a∈Rn
sup
b∈R
{
〈a,∇v〉+ 1
2
vb‖a‖2 − 1
2
R(b)‖a‖2
}
,
where the optimizer is a∗ = (F ′′(v)/F ′(v))∇v and b∗ = F ′(v)F ′′′(v)/F ′′(v)2 − 1.
Proof. The optimization supb∈R{vb−R(b)} = −F ′(v)/F ′′(v) is simply the definition
of the Fenchel conjugate. Moreover, as F is assumed to be smooth, the optimizer is
given by b∗ = (−F ′/F ′′)′(v) [33, Prop. 11.3]. The optimization over a is trivial. 
Lemma 5.3 reveals that the partial differential equation satisfied by v is none
other than the Bellman equation for the value of a stochastic control problem [18].
Theorem 5.4. Let F : I → R be a nonlinear smooth and strictly increasing func-
tion such that MF is convex. Then MF admits the stochastic representation
MF (f) = sup
α∈Cn
b
sup
β∈C1
b
Kf [α, β]
for every lower-semicontinuous function f : Rn → I, where
Kf [α, β] := E
[
e
1
2
∫ 1
0
βt‖αt‖
2dtf
(
W1+
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
e
1
2
∫
t
0
βs‖αs‖
2dsR(βt)‖αt‖2dt
]
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with R := (−F ′/F ′′)∗. Here Ckb denotes the family of all k-dimensional uniformly
bounded and progressively measurable processes.
This result should be viewed as an explicit stochastic representation of Fenchel
duality for the convex functional MF . In particular, as Kf [α, β] is linear in f , the
convexity of MF is immediately obvious from the representation.
Proof. We first assume that the function f is Lipschitz. DefineWαt := Wt+
∫ t
0
αs ds.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to e
1
2
∫
t
0
βs‖αs‖
2dsv(t,Wαt ) yields
e
1
2
∫
1
0
βt‖αt‖
2dtf(Wα1 )−
1
2
∫ 1
0
e
1
2
∫
t
0
βs‖αs‖
2dsR(βt)‖αt‖2dt =
v(0, 0) +
∫ 1
0
e
1
2
∫
t
0
βs‖αs‖
2ds〈∇v(t,Wαt ), dWt〉
+
∫ 1
0
e
1
2
∫
t
0
βs‖αs‖
2ds
{
∂v
∂t
(t,Wαt ) +
1
2
∆v(t,Wαt ) + 〈αt,∇v(t,Wαt )〉
+
1
2
βt‖αt‖2v(t,Wαt )−
1
2
R(βt)‖αt‖2
}
dt.
As f is Lipschitz, ∇v is uniformly bounded so the stochastic integral is a martingale.
Taking the expectation, and using Lemma 5.3 and the partial differential equation
for v yields Kf [α, β] ≤ v(0, 0) = MF (f) for every α ∈ Cnb and β ∈ C1b . Thus
sup
α∈Cn
b
sup
β∈C1
b
Kf [α, β] ≤MF (f).
It remains to note that the inequality is equality if we choose the optimal controls
α∗t =
F ′′(v(t,Xt))
F ′(v(t,Xt))
∇v(t,Xt),
β∗t =
F ′(v(t,Xt))F
′′′(v(t,Xt))
F ′′(v(t,Xt))2
− 1,
where Xt is the solution of the stochastic differential equation
dXt =
F ′′(v(t,Xt))
F ′(v(t,Xt))
∇v(t,Xt) dt+ dWt, X0 = 0.
Here we note that by our assumptions, F has bounded derivatives of all orders
and F ′ and F ′′ are uniformly bounded away from zero, v and ∇v are uniformly
bounded, and v(t, ·) has bounded derivatives of all orders for t < 1, so that this
stochastic differential equation has a unique strong solution and α∗ ∈ Cnb , β∗ ∈ C1b .
Now assume f is only lower-semicontinuous. Let fk(x) = infy{f(y)+ k‖x− y‖}.
Then fk : R
n → I is Lipschitz for every k and fk ↑ f pointwise as in the proof
of Lemma 4.7. The result follows using monotone convergence by applying the
stochastic representation of MF (fk) and taking the supremum over k. 
Let us illustrate Theorem 5.4 in some simple examples.
Example 5.5. Consider the case F (x) = ex that arises from the Gibbs variational
principle. Then F ′/F ′′ ≡ 1, so we readily compute R = (−F ′/F ′′)∗ as
R(x) =
{
1 for x = 0,
+∞ for x 6= 0.
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Substituting this expression into Theorem 5.4, we immediately recover the stochas-
tic representation discussed in the introduction.
Example 5.6. Consider the case F (x) = xp for p > 1, where we choose I =
[x−, x+] for some 0 < x− < x+ <∞. Then F ′, F ′′ > 0 and F ′(x)/F ′′(x) = x/(p−1)
is certainly concave. We readily compute R = (−F ′/F ′′)∗ as
R(x) =
{
0 for x = −1/(p− 1),
+∞ for x 6= −1/(p− 1).
Substituting this expression into Theorem 5.4 yields(∫
fpdγn
)1/p
= sup
α∈Cn
b
E
[
e−
1
2(p−1)
∫ 1
0
‖αt‖
2dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)]
.
This result could also be obtained along the lines of [11] by applying Girsanov’s
theorem to the representation (
∫
fpdγn)
1/p = supg>0:
∫
g dγn=1
∫
g1−1/pf dγn.
Example 5.7. Consider the case F (x) = xex on I = [0, C] for some C <∞. Then
F ′, F ′′ > 0 and F ′(x)/F ′′(x) = (1 + x)/(2 + x) is concave. We compute
R(x) =
{ −2√−x− 2x+ 1 for x ≤ 0,
+∞ for x > 0.
Substituting this expression into Theorem 5.4 yields
W
(∫
fef dγn
)
= sup
α∈Cn
b
sup
γ∈C1
b
E
[
e−
1
2
∫
1
0
γ2t ‖αt‖
2dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
γ2s‖αs‖
2ds(2γ2t − 2|γt|+ 1)‖αt‖2dt
]
,
where W is the Lambert W -function and we defined βt := −γ2t to enforce nonpos-
itivity. This expression can be simplified slightly by introducing the new control
ηt := |γt|αt. Rearranging the above expression then yields
W
(∫
fef dγn
)
= sup
α,η∈Cn
b
E
[
e−
1
2
∫ 1
0
‖ηt‖
2dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
αt dt
)
− 1
2
∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
‖ηs‖
2ds(‖ηt‖2 + ‖αt − ηt‖2)dt
]
.
We remark that the stochastic representation appears in surprisingly tractable form,
while it is not clear whether it is possible to obtain a tractable analogue of the Gibbs
variational principle MF (f) = supµ{
∫
f dµ−M∗F (µ)} in this example.
5.2. Generalized means and stochastic games. The essential idea behind the
proof of Theorem 5.4 was that when MF is convex, the nonlinear equation
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
∆v +
1
2
F ′′(v)
F ′(v)
‖∇v‖2 = 0
could be expressed as a supremum of linear parabolic equations
sup
a
{
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
∆v + 〈c1(a),∇v〉+ c2(a)v + c3(a)
}
= 0
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for some functions c1, c2, c3. Such a representation cannot hold when MF fails to
be convex. Nonetheless, even in the absence of convexity, we can try to express the
above nonlinear equation in the more complicated form
sup
a
inf
b
{
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
∆v + 〈c1(a, b),∇v〉+ c2(a, b)v + c3(a, b)
}
= 0
for some functions c1, c2, c3. If this is possible, then the arguments of Theorem 2.3
could be adapted to obtain a stochastic game representation for MF .
It has long been understood in the PDE literature that while convexity is a very
special property, almost any reasonable nonlinearity can be expressed in the form
of a game; see [16, 17] and the references therein. In the present context, this
implies that it is possible to obtain stochastic game representations for generalized
means MF under essentially no assumptions on the function F . Let us outline one
particular approach to obtaining such representations. In [16, §4.1], it is observed
that any locally Lipschitz function Ψ : Rk → R can be represented as
Ψ(x) = max
a∈Rk
min
b∈Rk
{∫ 1
0
〈∇Ψ((1− t)a+ tb), x− a〉 dt+Ψ(a)
}
(indeed, it suffices to note that a∗ = b∗ = x is a saddle point). Now assume, as
in the general setting of this section, that F : I → R is a smooth function on the
compact interval I that is strictly increasing F ′ > 0, and consider the function
Ψ(x, y) =
1
2
F ′′(x)
F ′(x)
‖y‖2, (x, y) ∈ I × Rn.
Then the gradient of Ψ is locally bounded, and thus the above maximin representa-
tion holds. It is a simple exercise to repeat the proof of Theorem 2.3 in the present
setting to obtain a completely general stochastic game representation for MF .
Remark 5.8. There are two minor issues that require care in extending Theorem
2.3 to the general setting. First, the representation will hold for functions f that
are smooth with bounded derivatives, but one cannot trivially extend to bounded
uniformly continuous functions (as in the present case the exponential factor in front
of f in the representation need not have a universal upper bound). Second, for the
same reason, one should work with the smaller classes of controls and strategies
Cb := {β ∈ C : ‖β‖∞ <∞}, Sb := {α ∈ S : sup‖β‖∞≤R ‖α(β)‖∞ <∞ ∀R <∞}.
Carrying out the approach outlined above would give rise to a very general
representation of MF as a stochastic game. However, this representation is not
canonical. The usefulness of a stochastic game representation in a given situation
will generally rely on some structural properties of the representation that may be
far from evident in this particular formulation. For example, applying the above
representation to the case F (x) = Φ(x) yields a rather ugly expression from which
one would be hard-pressed to conclude the validity of Ehrhard’s inequality. While
the existence of stochastic game representations for general MF sheds some light
on the origin of the phenomenon observed in Theorem 2.3, a genuinely useful repre-
sentation of this kind should be specifically chosen to possess the desired structural
properties that are relevant to the problem under consideration. We have already
seen an example of this in the previous section, where special representations were
chosen for convex MF from which the convexity property becomes evident, and in
Theorem 2.3. As a further illustration we provide one additional example.
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Example 5.9. Consider F (x) = 1 − e−x2/2 on I = [ε, 2c] for 0 < ε < 2c < ∞.
This function behaves very similarly to Φ(x) as x→∞, at least to leading order in
the exponent. We might therefore expect a stochastic game representation of MF
that is similar to that of Theorem 2.3. Let us see how this can be achieved.
We begin by computing
F ′′(x)
F ′(x)
= −x+ 1
x
.
Note that the term −x is precisely what arises for Φ, but we now have an additional
term. To obtain a representation that is similar to that for Φ, we apply Lemma 2.4
to the first term and introduce an additional control for the second term:
1
2
F ′′(v)
F ′(v)
‖∇v‖2 = −1
2
v‖∇v‖2 + 1
2v
‖∇v‖2
= sup
a∈Rn
inf
b∈Rn
{
〈a+ cb,∇v + b〉 − 1
2
v‖b‖2
}
+ sup
a˜∈Rn
{
〈a˜,∇v〉 − 1
2
v‖a˜‖2
}
.
One can now repeat the proof of Theorem 2.3 to obtain the representation
MF (f) =
√
−2 log
(∫
e−f2/2 dγn
)
= sup
α,α˜∈S
inf
β∈C
E
[ ∫ 1
0
e−
1
2
∫
t
0
(‖α˜s(β)‖
2+‖βs‖
2)ds〈αt(β), βt〉 dt
+ e−
1
2
∫ 1
0
(‖α˜t(β)‖
2+‖βt‖
2)dtf
(
W1 +
∫ 1
0
(αt(β) + α˜t(β)) dt
)]
for any bounded, uniformly continuous, and nonnegative function f . Notice that,
while this representation is quite close to that of Theorem 2.3 (in particular, we see
that MF ≥ MΦ by setting α˜ = 0), the present representation is not concave in α˜
and we therefore do not obtain an Ehrhard-type inequality for MF .
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